Abstract-Multicast distribution employs the model of manyto-many so that it is a more efficient way of data delivery compared to traditional one-to-one unicast distribution, which can benefit many applications such as media streaming. However, the lack of security features in its nature makes multicast technology much less popular in an open environment such as the Internet. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) take advantage of IP multicast technology's high efficiency of data delivery to provide Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) to their users. But without the full control on their networks, ISPs cannot collect revenue for the services they provide. Secure Internet Group Management Protocol (SIGMP), an extension of Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP), and Group Security Association Management Protocol (GSAM), have been proposed to enforce receiver access control at the network level of IP multicast. In this paper, we analyze operational details and issues of both SIGMP and GSAM. An examination of the performance of both protocols is also conducted.
I. INTRODUCTION
IP multicast uses a one-to-many or many-to-many model for communication. A multicast packet is only sent by the source once and it is replicated on the nodes of the network to reach multiple receivers. On the contrary, the other method of delivery, IP unicast, employs a one-to-one model. Although IP unicast is less efficient compared to IP multicast, it is more popular on the Internet because of easier access control. Since a unicast packet will only reach one receiver and it is specified by the sender, end-to-end encryption can be achieved. While a multicast packet is seen as being sent away from the source and replicated on the way, the information of the receivers is hidden from the sender so that the sender has no control over who will receive the packet.
For example, IPTV uses IP multicast to deliver television content to subscribers, in contrast to traditional video streaming services that use IP unicast such as Youtube and Netflix. Although, IPTV services have been used across the world and generate a large amount of revenue [1] , due to the fact that IP multicast has no built-in security feature, so it is difficult for someone who does not have the full control of the network to provide an IPTV service. In the case of IPTV service provided by an ISP, the multicast packets of the video stream are sent by servers controlled by them, replicated on multicast routers controlled by them and arrive to the Set-top Box (STB) provided before the content of the video stream is shown on the TV. Because the ISPs control every waypoint of their IPTV delivery, they are able to account for the amount of content watched by the users and collect revenue from them. This is not the case in the open Internet.
Before the very first frame of video of IPTV is shown, several processes of communication must be done over the network between the subscriber's STB and the source of the video stream. Joining a multicast group using IGMP is the first process.
While secure methods for delivering unicast content are well established, no secure form of IGMP has been established. Li & Atwood [2] have proposed and validated extensions to IGMP, called Secure Internet Group Management Protocol (SIGMP), to provide secure access control for multicast traffic. In addition, they have proposed a new protocol called Group Security Association Management Protocol (GSAM) to manage the necessary keys.
However, the security features provided by SIGMP and GSAM introduce additional latency. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the effects of this additional latency. This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides some background information needed for the paper. Section III introduces the SIGMP and GSAM protocols. We put the problem statement in Section IV. Section V shows our analysis for the SIGMP and GSAM protocols, followed by our simulations and results in Section VI. Finally, we come to a conclusion in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND A. IGMP and MLD
Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) is a multicast protocol used to inquire about and report the interests of group membership in a local network. There are currently three major versions of the protocol: IGMPv1 [3] , IGMPv2 [4] and IGMPv3 [5] respectively. Every IGMP message is directly attached to an IPv4 header and delivered to neighboring local network in plaintext. Therefore, anyone attached to the local network can receive every IGMP message. Furthermore, the Querier (on the router) will process all the Report messages it receives (from any host) meaning that anyone on the local network can join any group. MLD provides the same services for IPv6.
B. IGMP and IPTV
The process of joining a member group in IGMP is essential to IPTV and it contributes a certain amount of latency to the Channel Zapping Time of IPTV. In commercial IPTV, the delay of channel switching consists of three components [6] : 1) Network Delay (including IGMP delay): usually shorter than 100-200ms 2) Synchronization Delay: 500-2000ms 3) Buffering Delay: 1-2s As we can see, the latency caused by IGMP only occupies a small portion of Channel Zapping Time.
C. IPsec
IPsec [7] is a suite of protocols used to protect communication over IP networks, providing confidentiality, data integrity, access control, and data source authentication to IP datagrams. IPsec provide protocols to protect the data and protocols to manage the keys and other cryptographic parameters. The set of parameters for a particular data exchange is represented by a Security Association (SA) (for the unicast case) or a Group Security Association (GSA) (for the multicast case). SIGMP makes use of the data protection features of IPsec, and GSAM provides the necessary specialized kay and parameter management for SIGMP. The SA or GSA in use is identified by a Security Parameter Index (SPI).
D. ns-3
We choose ns-3 [8] as our simulation platform. The ns-3 simulator has a solid simulation core that is well documented, easy to use and debug, and that caters to the needs of the entire simulation workflow, from simulation configuration to trace collection and analysis. Furthermore, the ns-3 software infrastructure encourages the development of simulation models. ns-3 employs the model of Object-oriented programming. Similar entities, processes and functions are categorized into an ns-3 module. A module of ns-3 contains the definition and declaration of one or more C++ classes that compose a protocol in the network stack, abstraction of a physical entity, a software component in a network system, or a utility for simulation.
III. SIGMP AND GSAM
SIGMP and GSAM is an approach [2] , within the Secure Architecture [9] , to provide security service for IGMP/MLD messages so that revenue collection is possible.
The generation of the delivery tree of a multicast stream depends on information of multicast group memberships in the IGMP/MLD database. The SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle uses IPsec to provide per-group access control over IGMP/MLD messages without modifying any existing protocol.
A. SIGMP
SIGMP is an extension for IGMPv2, IGMPv3 and MLD, offering Confidentiality and Authentication. It is based on adding appropriate IPsec headers to IGMP or MLD messages.
To provide these services, IGMP messages are divided into two categories: secure and unsecure. While unsecure messages are identical to those in IGMP, every secure one is enveloped by an Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header and protected by a pair of GSAs established by GSAM.
B. GSAM
GSAM is a key management protocol to establish the parameters for the GSA s used by SIGMP participants. It uses UDP as IKEv2 does. Identical to IGMP, there are three kinds of participants in SIGMP: Querier (Q), Non-Querier (NQ) and Group Member (GM). Particularly Q and NQ are multicast routers and they act as enforcement points in GSAM.
The operation of GSAM is divided into two phases of message exchanges, similar to IKEv2 [10] . The purpose of the first phase is to establish a secure and authenticated communication channel between two GSAM entities, which can be later used to convey messages in phase two. At the end of phase one, one secure communication channel is established for each pair of GM and Q per group while there is one channel for each pair of GM and NQ, shared for communication for all groups. In phase two, the Q will use these secure communication channels to distribute GSAs to NQs and GMs.
As in IKEv2, a message exchange in GSAM consists of a pair of messages: a request and a response. Considering a message can be lost during the transmission, retransmission of a request message might take place. One must reply with a response message upon receiving a request message. However, a response message should never be transmitted twice.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT Li and Atwood [2] have proposed and validated extensions to IGMP, called SIGMP, and a new key management protocol, called GSAM, to manage the necessary keys and other parameters. The validation is from the prospective of security. However, while the SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle has been shown to provide the necessary security features, its use will also introduce extra latency when compared to (unsecure) IGMP. The security validation does not model the timing-dependent features of the protocol bundle. Since this performance overhead is unavoidable, the goal of the present project is to evaluate its impact on the Quality of Experience (QoE) of the user. In addition, the construction of a simulation of the protocol bundle permits the discovery of any features of the protocol that are dependent on specific timing of events.
IGMP is one of the primary underlying protocols of IPTV service. IPTV is a very good commercial use case to evaluate the performance of the protocol bundle because it is a paid service and a user is sensitive to the time of channel changing. Changing channels in IPTV requires IGMP to join multicast groups, which contributes a certain amount of latency to the total time of channel changing.
V. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS

A. Operation Overview
In the process of joining an unsecure group, SIGMP behaves identically to regular IGMP. Therefore, there is no performance overhead in such cases. In the case of joining a secure group, the GSA pair needs to be established prior to transmission of any messages for that secure group. In other words, GSAM negotiation has to be done before the joining process of SIGMP can begin.
GSAM negotiation is divided into two phases and initiated by a GM who wants to join a secure group. In phase one, to establish a secure and authenticated communication channel, two message exchanges take place between two GSAM entities, which are either the Q and a GM or the Q and an NQ. Each such message exchange consists of one request and one response. In phase two, the Q is responsible to generate a pair of GSAs and distribute it to the GM and all NQs. However, since the SPI values in the pair of GSAs are unilaterally determined by the Q, SPI conflict may occur when the receivers, NQs and the GM, install the pair of GSAs. In the case of SPI conflict, all recipients of the pair of GSAs will report the occupied SPI values in their database back to the Q. Moreover, if the SPI conflict is from the GSA for protecting query message, the Q will also need to request SPI reports from other GMs that have joined the group. Once the Q collects all reports, it will generate and install a new pair of GSAs. Meanwhile, the installed GSAs will also be distributed to the GM and all NQs. In the case of no SPI conflict, the Q will wait until it collects all the acknowledgement from GSAs recipients and then install the pair of GSAs it generated.
B. Factors of Overhead
From what is stated above, we can see that the time needed to negotiate the pair of GSAs contributes a certain amount of latency to overall performance overhead. The number of messages exchanged during each GSAM negotiation is affected by:
1) The number of NQs 2) The number of GMs that have already joined the group 3) The probability of SPI conflict Assuming we have m NQs and n GMs that have joined the group, the minimal number of messages to transmit is seven and the maximal number is 10 + 5m + 3n
Moreover, because of different cases of SPI conflict, the time between the ending of a GSAM negotiation and the starting of the SIGMP process must also be taken into account. In the original SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle, the GM will send an SIGMP Report message immediately after the acknowledgement for the GSA pairs when there is no SPI conflict on the GM side. However, when executing the initial simulations, we discovered that this causes a performance issue. When the SIGMP Report message arrives at the Q before the acknowledgement, it will be discarded because the GSAs are yet to be installed. Therefore, the joining process for the group will not proceed until the GM sends a report as a response to the next General Query message from the Q. To solve this issue, we had to revise the messages sequence in GSAM negotiation. The Q will send a Group-Specific Query message once the GSAs are installed and the GM will only report its interest for the group when it receives the Group-Specific Query message, rather than reporting its interest immediately after accepting the initially offered SPI.
VI. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
A. Setup and Assumptions
We implemented SIGMP and GSAM protocols as modules of the ns-3 simulator. SIGMP modules, including IGMP, are built on top of network layer modules of the simulator while GSAM modules are constructed on top of the simulator's built-in UDP modules. Moreover, we also implement the IPsec databases necessary for the use of GSAM and integrate them into the simulator's IP modules. Development of the GSAM modules required us to define the precise packet formats for GSAM; the details are in [11] .
We model the boundary mechanism of IPsec. In Section VI-B, we show the results for two cases: with and without considering the time of encryption. Studies [12] [13] show the duration of running symmetric encryption in a software-only implementation on an ARM processor is typically between 1 and 2 Milliseconds, which is small compared to the assumed latency of the network (see below) and negligible compared to the factors we analyzed above. Additionally, we make the following settings and assumptions:
1) All hosts reside in a CSMA/CD ethernet segment with 100Mbps speed and 10ms latency. 2) IGMPv3's parameters are set to the default values as specified by the IETF protocol specification. 3) GMs periodically join a random group every second.
B. Results
In ns-3, we run simulations to compare join time between IGMPv3 and SIGMP with three different testing configurations shown in the following: 1) In the network segment, there are one Q, two NQs and ten GMs, we compare the latency of two protocols with different probability of SPI conflict. 2) In the network segment, there are one Q and ten GMs. The probability of SPI conflict is set to 20%. We we compare the latency of two protocols with different numbers of NQs. 3) In the network segment, there are one Q and two NQs.
In order to avoid network congestion, we also increase the intervals of Report messages sent from GMs to ten seconds. Then we compare the latency of two protocols with different numbers of GMs
C. Analysis of Results
From Figure 1 , we can see the latency of SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle gradually increases as the probability of SPI conflict becomes higher. As we can see from Figure 2 , the latency drastically increases when there are more NQs. Figure Fig To see the effect of the cryptographic operations, we simulated the latency cost by delaying the sending of packets according to the size of packets, using the performance numbers for the NXP LPC1768, which is a low performance board, from [13] , where the cryptographic operations are entirely in software. The results of the respective simulations are shown in Figure 4 , Figure 5 and Figure 6 . As we can see, the impact is negligible. For any higher performance environment, the impact will be even smaller. The first result of this project is the discovery that unacceptable latency occurs if a joining GM is permitted to issue its SIGMP Report before being certain that the initially-proposed SPI is acceptable to all parties. The proposed alteration of the operation of SIGMP, to delay the GM Report until a Groupspecific query is received, resolves this issue.
The second result is that the overhead of the SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle, for reasonable numbers of NQs and GMs, is in the range of 200-300 milliseconds, which is larger than the normal budget for network delays, and significantly larger than the delay for IGMP alone. However, it is still small relative to the Synchronization and Buffering delays.
On the other hand, the security features that it provides not only cover the duration of running the protocol bundle alone but the entire operation of its application. Take IPTV as an example, the Network Delay only contributes a small amount in its Channel Zapping Time. Most of IPTV performance overhead lies in the processing of video streams, which may takes up to seconds. Therefore, when we replace pure IGMP with SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle, the increased Network Delay is still small compared to the cost of video processing.
